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Justice Jackson and the Second 
Flag Salute Case (Part II)
By Douglas E. Abrams
 In the summer issue of Precedent, 
Part I of this article said that carefully 
balancing reason and passion can 
invigorate not only judicial opinion-
writing, but also the written advocacy 
of counsel who seek to persuade 
the decision makers. Part I recited 
the story behind Justice Robert H. 
Jackson’s majority opinion in West 
Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette, and presented the rich 
historical pedigree of reason and 
passion as complementary rhetorical 
forces. 
 This concluding Part II now 
examines the balance that Justice 
Jackson struck in Barnette and 
discusses the contemporary roles 
that reason and passion can play in 
opinion-writing and advocacy. Law 
school teaches students to reason 
their way to a conclusion, but many 
cases can evoke passion in reasonable 
advocates and reasonable judges as 
they apply the law to the facts. 
Reason and Passion in 
Judicial Opinion-Writing 
 Throughout our nation’s history, 
much has been said about the extent 
to which judges can or should let 
personal feelings affect the decision-
making process.1 The debate continues 
today as partisans frequently accuse 
opponents of choosing “judicial 
activists,” judges who assertedly 
decide important cases based on their 
own personal predilections rather 
than by strictly applying precedents, 
statutes, and other relevant sources of 
law.2
 This debate is not the issue here, 
which concerns not how judges 
reach decisions, but how vigorous, 
forceful writing can justify and 
explain decisions. The Court decided 
Barnette by internal debate and vote in 
conference before Justice Jackson ever 
put pen to paper.
 Judges write opinions as public 
officers vested by constitution and 
statute with authority to speak with the 
force of law. Formulas do not decide 
cases, but in constitutional and non-
constitutional decision-making alike, 
“reason” loosely means application 
of relevant legal doctrine to the facts, 
and “passion” loosely means vigorous, 
forceful opinion writing that justifies 
and explains the decision’s grounding 
in fact and law. The core aspiration, 
says Justice Stephen Breyer, is that 
“when a judge writes an opinion, 
even in a highly visible, politically 
controversial case with public feeling 
running high, the opinion’s reasoning 
– not simply the author’s conclusion – 
can make all the difference.”3
Balance
 On a collegial appellate court, 
the appropriate balance of reason 
and passion depends in significant 
measure on whether the judge is 
writing a majority, concurring or 
dissenting opinion. “[A] strong 
opinion,” says Justice Breyer, “is 
principled, reasoned, transparent, and 
informative. And a strong opinion 
should prove persuasive, making a 
lasting impression on the minds of 
those who read it, and (if a dissent) 
eventually influence the law to move 
in the direction it proposes.”4
 A majority opinion determines the 
parties’ rights and obligations while 
creating precedents and rationales 
for future cases. Reason may rein in 
passion because the writer seeking 
to maintain the coalition knows that 
every paragraph, sentence and clause 
– including every passage tinged 
with emotion – remains grist for later 
citation and potential application. 
A later court may find a particular 
passage to constitute holding, or 
else to constitute dictum warranting 
distinction or some measure of 
persuasive effect, but the passage’s 
effect as a source of law derives from 
the court’s constitutional and statutory 
authority to decide cases. 
 Writers of concurring and dissenting 
opinions may feel less need to restrain 
emotion because their writings, by 
themselves, convey no immediate law. 
If the writer so chooses, a concurrence 
and particularly a dissent can rely 
more on passion, freer from the need 
to maintain a majority coalition or to 
exercise circumspection in decision-
making. Dean Roscoe Pound said that 
on a court of last resort, a dissenting 
opinion “should express [the judge’s] 
reason, not his feelings.”5 At one time 
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or another, however, most of the recent 
justices have seen the media call many 
of their dissents “passionate.”6 
 “A dissent in a court of last resort,” 
wrote Chief Justice Charles Evans 
Hughes, is “an appeal to the brooding 
spirit of the law, to the intelligence 
of a future day, when a later decision 
may possibly correct the error into 
which the dissenting judge believes 
the court to have been betrayed.”7 The 
dissenter’s appeal to posterity stands 
a better chance with a disciplined 
dose of reason than with scarcely 
restrained passion. From one era 
to the next, justices such as Oliver 
Wendell Holmes and John Marshall 
Harlan have held the title of a “Great 
Dissenter,” but their most influential 
dissents persuaded future Courts with 
reasoned legal analysis delivered 
forcefully, and not with unadorned 
fist-pounding or shrill emotion.   
Barnette  
 Barnette demonstrates that focused 
passion may invigorate a majority 
opinion’s reasoned analysis. From the 
outset, every participant in the flag-
salute drama sensed the high stakes at 
issue. Few claims of right command 
the respect that accompanies sincere 
invocations of religious liberty, and 
few justifications for government 
action command greater force than 
invocations of national security in 
wartime. As the Court applied the 
First Amendment during the struggle 
against totalitarian regimes, Justice 
Jackson sought to instruct that 
Americans would tolerate personal 
conscience, even when reverence for 
the flag was at stake.  
 The reasoned instruction would 
have fallen flat if Barnette’s majority 
delivered what then-Professor Felix 
Frankfurter had disparaged in 1931 as 
“the inevitable lawyer’s writing – the 
dull qualifications and circumlocutions 
that sink any literary barque or even 
freighter, the lifeless tags and rags that 
preclude grace and stifle spontaneity.”8 
Turgid legalese would have decided 
the case for the parties, but would 
also likely have destined the decision 
for little more than swift deposit in 
the u.S. rePortS, barely remembered 
among later decisions that would 
reaffirm similar constitutional 
propositions. Instead, Justice Jackson 
assured Barnette’s immortality by 
combining reason with passion to 
dismantle the four specific grounds 
that Justice Frankfurter had advanced 
in Gobitis:  
Gobitis Ground # 1: Granting some 
public school children exemptions 
from mandatory flag salute and 
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance 
would make the government appear 
“too weak to maintain its own 
existence.”9 
 Justice Jackson scoffed at the notion 
that “the strength of government to 
maintain itself would be impressively 
vindicated by our confirming power 
of the state to expel a handful of 
children from school.”10 “Government 
of limited power need not be anemic 
government,” he continued, with 
passion accompanying the statement 
of reason. “Assurance that rights are 
secure tends to diminish fear and 
jealousy of strong government, and 
by making us feel safe to live under 
it makes for its better support. . . . To 
enforce [the Bill of Rights] today is 
not to choose weak government over 
strong government. It is only to adhere 
as a means of strength to individual 
freedom of mind in preference to 
officially disciplined uniformity for 
which history indicates a disappointing 
and disastrous end.”11
Gobitis Ground # 2:  By creating 
constitutionally-based exemptions 
to mandatory in-school flag salutes, 
federal judges would become “the 
school board for the country.”12 
 The Fourteenth Amendment, Justice 
Jackson countered, “protects the 
citizen against the State itself and all 
of its creatures -- Boards of Education 
not excepted.”13 Once again, passion 
took center stage. School boards 
“have, of course, important, delicate, 
and highly discretionary functions, 
but none that they may not perform 
within the limits of the Bill of Rights. 
That they are educating the young for 
citizenship is reason for scrupulous 
protection of Constitutional freedoms 
of the individual, if we are not to 
strangle the free mind at its source 
and teach youth to discount important 
principles of our government as mere 
platitudes.”14
Gobitis Ground # 3: Because 
exemptions from mandatory in-school 
flag salutes raise disciplinary issues 
beyond the competence of federal 
judges, exemptions should be won at 
the ballot box and not in the courts.15 
 “The very purpose of a Bill of 
Rights,” Justice Jackson responded 
with a firm, passionate voice, “was 
to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, 
to place them beyond the reach of 
majorities and officials and to establish 
them as legal principles to be applied 
by the courts. One’s right to life, 
liberty, and property, to free speech, 
a free press, freedom of worship and 
assembly, and other fundamental 
rights may not be submitted to vote; 
they depend on the outcome of no 
elections.”16




Jackson continued, “not by authority 
of our competence but by force of our 
commissions. We cannot, because of 
modest estimates of our competence 
in such specialties as public education, 
withhold the judgment that history 
authenticates as the function of this 
Court when liberty is infringed.”17  
Gobitis Ground # 4: The Constitution 
permits mandatory in-school flag 
salutes because “[t]he ultimate 
foundation of a free society is the 
binding tie of cohesive sentiment.”18 
 “Those who begin coercive 
elimination of dissent,” Justice 
Jackson wrote, “soon find themselves 
exterminating dissenters. Compulsory 
unification of opinion achieves only 
the unanimity of the graveyard.”19
 “[W]e apply the limitations of the 
Constitution,” he explained, “with no 
fear that freedom to be intellectually 
and spiritually diverse or even 
contrary will disintegrate the social 
organization.”20 
 To believe that patriotism 
will not flourish if patriotic 
ceremonies are voluntary 
and spontaneous instead of a 
compulsory routine is to make 
an unflattering estimate of 
the appeal of our institutions 
to free minds. We can have 
intellectual individualism and 
the rich cultural diversities 
that we owe to exceptional 
minds only at the price of 
occasional eccentricity and 
abnormal attitudes. When they 
are so harmless to others or 
to the State as those we deal 
with here, the price is not too 
great. But freedom to differ is 
not limited to things that do 
not matter much. That would 
be a mere shadow of freedom. 
The test of its substance is the 
right to differ as to things that 
touch the heart of the existing 
order.21
 Justice Jackson closed his opinion 
with a reasoned, yet passionate 
endorsement of individual freedom 
that has been called “the most 
illuminating definition of Americanism 
in the history of the Court”: “If there 
is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion 
or force citizens to confess by word or 
act their faith therein.”22
 After more than 60 years, Barnette 
remains the basis for the First 
Amendment right to “refrain from 
speaking.”23 Gobitis had applied the 
First Amendment’s religion clauses; 
by ruling instead under the First 
Amendment Speech Clause, Barnette 
conferred rights on all claimants who 
establish entitlement, and not only on 
claimants moved by religious belief.24 
 By the time Justice Jackson 
finished, his blend of reason and 
passion had bequeathed a decision 
whose bedrock First Amendment 
holding, according to Professor 
Charles Alan Wright, “teems with 
vivid expressions and memorable 
statements” that still enrich the fabric 
of the law as statements of core 
American values.25
Reason and Passion in 
Written Advocacy
 In the adversary system of civil 
and criminal justice, judges hold 
no monopoly on the effective use 
of reason and passion in written 
expression. Indeed, judicial decision-
making begins with the parties’ 
advocates, who raise, frame and argue 
issues of law and fact. Judge Irving R. 
Kaufman of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the 2nd Circuit described “the 
partnership between advocates and 
judges.”26  
 Recognition of this partnership 
reaches the highest levels. “The 
law is made by the Bar, even more 
than by the Bench,” said then-Judge 
Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1885.27 “A 
judge rarely performs his functions 
adequately,” added Justice Louis D. 
Brandeis, “unless the case before him 
is adequately presented.”28 Justice 
Felix Frankfurter reported that in the 
Supreme Court and lower courts alike, 
“the judicial process [is] at its best” 
when courts receive “comprehensive 
briefs and powerful arguments on both 
sides.”29
Balance
 By carefully balancing reason and 
passion, the advocates’ briefs can 
help influence the court’s opinion. 
As “a representative of clients” and 
“an officer of the legal system,”30 an 
advocate expects that the opinion 
may incorporate portions of the 
prevailing brief’s argument and 
analysis.31 Indeed, incorporation can 
be a professional badge of honor 
for counsel who prevails. “When an 
attorney writes such an excellent brief 
that some of its passages make their 
way into the eventual decision, he 
experiences a sense of gratification,” 
said Chief Justice George Rossman of 
the Oregon Supreme Court.32
 Brief writers walk a tightrope 
when they seek to balance reason and 
passion. The court “does not want 
a law review article,” said Judge 
Kaufman, but it “does not want 
rhetoric or flamboyance either.”33 
The consensus appears to be that 
judges want, expect and need each 
party’s reasoned argument, delivered 
WRITING IT RIGHT8 
o 
19Precedent  Fall 2011
passionately, for why the party should 
prevail under the law. 
 Speaking about written briefs, Judge 
Jacques L. Wiener, Jr. of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit 
instructs that “[j]udges are human
. . . so you must demonstrate both why 
your client should win (the emotional 
element) and the proper legal way that 
your client can win (the intellectual 
element).”34 “Your written argument 
should not be devoid of passion, but 
it must be grounded in logic, legally 
supported, and ‘readable.’”35
 Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan 
A. Garner say that “[a]ppealing 
to judges’ emotions is misguided 
because it fundamentally mistakes 
their motivation. Good judges pride 
themselves on the rationality of their 
rulings and the suppression of their 
personal proclivities, including most 
especially their emotions.”36 But Scalia 
and Garner also urge counsel
to “[a]ppeal not just to rules but to 
justice and common sense.”37 
“[D]emonstrate, if possible, not only 
that your client does prevail under 
applicable law but also that this result 
is reasonable. . . . [E]xplain why it is 
that what might seem unjust is in fact 
fair and equitable – in this very case, 
if possible – and, if not there, then in 
the vast majority of cases to which the 
rule you are urging will apply.”38
Conclusion: “If It Was an 
Easy Case, We Wouldn’t 
Have It”
 In a 2007 discussion with students 
and faculty at the Northwestern 
University School of Law, Chief 
Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. illustrated 
how an advocate’s reason should 
constrain but not totally eclipse 
passion. For some advocates, 
“passion” may mean simply 
dressing up a brief’s otherwise 
unadorned sentence with “clearly” 
or “manifestly.” “We get hundreds 
and hundreds of briefs, and they’re 
all the same,” said the Chief Justice. 
“Somebody says, ‘My client clearly 
deserves to win, the cases clearly do 
this, the language clearly reads this.’ 
. . . And you pick up the other side 
and, lo and behold, they think they 
clearly deserve to win.”39 
 The justices, he suggested, find 
such argument unpersuasive because 
“if it was an easy case, we wouldn’t 
have it.”40 An advocate’s more 
effective approach may be to abandon 
fist-pounding and adverbs in favor 
of passionate, but more focused, 
discussion about the reasons why the 
client should prevail under the law and 
facts – that is, to energize passionate 
expression with solid explanations 
grounded in reason.
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Missouri Bar Asks Lawyers to Voluntarily 
Report Annual Pro Bono Hours
Missouri Lawyers Lack Recognition for Their Pro Bono Service
Many Missouri lawyers generously help ensure that justice extends to those 
less fortunate by making pro bono work an integral part of their practices. 
However, this honorable commitment often lacks the recognition it deserves 
within the legal profession and is for the most part unknown to the general 
public.
Voluntary Reporting Can Change That
The Missouri Bar hopes to change this by asking lawyers to voluntarily 
report the number of hours they commit to pro bono work annually. This 
reporting will provide valuable information about the collective and individual 
pro bono efforts of Missouri lawyers, help the bar better recognize these 
efforts, and inspire other lawyers to perform pro bono services. By reporting, 
individual lawyers will play a vital role in this effort.
Reporting Your Pro Bono Hours is Quick and Easy
Just go to The Missouri Bar website (www.mobar.org) and follow the link to 
the pro bono reporting form. You will need your members-only bar number 
and PIN to complete the brief form.
Lawyers can report total pro bono hours for 2010 now and 2011 hours 
throughout the year or at year-end.
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